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Abstract
Frege’s Grundgesetze was one of the 19th century forerunners to contemporary
set theory which was plagued by the Russell paradox. In recent years, it has been
shown that subsystems of the Grundgesetze formed by restricting the comprehension
schema are consistent. One aim of this paper is to ascertain how much set theory can be
developed within these consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze, and our main theorem
(Theorem 2.9) shows that there is a model of a fragment of the Grundgesetze which
defines a model of all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception of
the power set axiom. The proof of this result appeals to Go¨del’s constructible universe
of sets and to Kripke and Platek’s idea of the projectum, as well as to a weak version
of uniformization (which does not involve knowledge of Jensen’s fine structure theory).
The axioms of the Grundgesetze are examples of abstraction principles, and the other
primary aim of this paper is to articulate a sufficient condition for the consistency of
abstraction principles with limited amounts of comprehension (Theorem 3.5). As an
application, we resolve an analogue of the joint consistency problem in the predicative
setting.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent renewed interest in the technical facets of Frege’s Grundgesetze
([6], [8]) paralleling the long-standing interest in Frege’s philosophy of mathematics and logic
([11], [2]). This interest has been engendered by the consistency proofs, due to Parsons [31],
Heck [21], and Ferreira-Wehmeier [14], of this system with limited amounts of comprehension.
The broader intellectual interest in Frege’s Grundgesetze stems in part from the two related
ways in which it was a predecessor of contemporary set theory: first, the system was originally
designed to be able to reconstruct much of ordinary mathematics, and second it comes
equipped with the resources needed to define a membership relation. It is thus natural
to ask how much set theory can be consistently developed within these fragments of the
Grundgesetze. Our main theorem (Theorem 2.9) shows it is possible within some models of
these fragments to recover all the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the exception
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of the power set axiom. To make this precise, one needs to carefully set out the primitives of
the consistent fragments of the Grundgesetze and indicate what precisely it means to recover
a fragment of set theory. This is the primary goal of §2 of the paper.
Following Wright and Hale ([20], cf. [8]), the system of the Grundgesetze has been studied
in recent decades as a special case of so-called abstraction principles. These are principles
that postulate lower-order representatives for equivalence relations on higher-order entities.
Many of these principles are inconsistent with full comprehension, which intuitively says that
every formula determines a concept or higher-order entity. So as with the Grundgesetze, the
idea has been to look for consistency with respect to the so-called predicative instances of
the comprehension schema, in which the presence of higher-order quantifiers within formulas
is highly restricted. Of course, while predicativity in connection with the Grundgesetze is
a fairly new topic, predicativity has a long tradition within mathematical logic, beginning
with Poincare´, Russell, and Weyl ([22], [43]), and found in our day in the work of Feferman
([13, 12]) and in ACA0 and related systems of Friedman and Simpson’s project of reverse
mathematics ([18], [39]).
The other chief theorem of this paper (Theorem 3.5) shows that an abstraction principle
associated to an equivalence relation is consistent with predicative comprehension so long
as the equivalence relation is provably an equivalence relation in a limited theory of pure
second-order logic and is expressible in the signature of that pure second-order logic. One
application of this result is a resolution to the joint consistency problem in the predicative
setting. For, in the setting of full comprehension, it has been known for some time that
there are abstraction principles which are individually but not jointly consistent. In §3, we
define the notion of an abstraction principle and further contextualize our results within the
extant literature on abstraction principles.
The methods used in all these results draw on considerations related to Go¨del’s con-
structible universe of sets. Whereas in the cumulative hierarchy of sets Vα, one proceeds by
iterating the operation of the powerset into the transfinite, in the constructible hierarchy of
sets Lα, one proceeds by iterating the operation of taking definable subsets into the transfi-
nite. Go¨del showed that just like the universe of sets V =
⋃
α Vα is a model of the axioms
of set theory, so the constructible universe of sets L =
⋃
α Lα is a model of the axioms of
set theory, along with a strong form of the axiom of choice according to which the elements
of L are well-ordered by a relation <L (cf. [25] Chapter 13, [29] Chapter 6, [30] II.6, [10]).
Our present understanding of the more “local” or “micro” properties of the constructible
sets was furthered by the work of Kripke ([28]), Platek ([32]) and Jensen ([26]), in whose
results we find the key ideas of the projectum and uniformization. Roughly, a level Lα of
the constructible hierarchy satisfies uniformization if whenever it satisfies ∀ x ∃ y R(x, y)
then there is a definable function f of the same level of complexity as R which satis-
fies ∀ x R(x, f(x)). The projectum, on the other hand, is related to the idea that cer-
tain initial segments Lα of the constructible universe can be shrunk via a definable injec-
tion ι : Lα → ρ to a smaller ordinal ρ < α. The formal definitions of the projectum and
uniformization are given in §4. It bears emphasizing that we only employ a weak version
of uniformization which has an elementary proof, and so this paper does not presuppose
2
knowledge of Jensen’s fine structure theory (cf. Proposition 4.3).
It’s actually rather natural to think that uniformization and the projectum would be
useful in producing models of abstraction principles. On the one hand, given an equivalence
relation E on the set P (ρ) ∩ Lα, we can conceive of the elements of this set as higher-order
entities, and then we can take the lower-order representative in ρ of an E-equivalence class
to be the injection ι applied to the <L-least element of E’s equivalence class. On the other
hand, uniformization allows one to secure further instances of the comprehension schema in
which there are some controlled occurrences of higher-order quantifiers, in essence because
one can use uniformization to choose one particular higher-order entity with which to work.
This, in any case, is the intuitive idea behind the proof of our theorem on the consistency
of abstraction principles (Theorem 3.5) which we prove in §5. However, this does not itself
deliver our result on how much set theory one can recover in the consistent fragments of the
Grundgesetze. For this, we need to additionally show that if we start from a level of the
constructible hierarchy which satisfies certain axioms of set theory, and if we perform the
construction of a model of the fragment of the Grundgesetze in the manner intimated in the
above paragraph and made precise in §5, then we can recover these original constructible
sets definably within the model of the fragment of the Grundgesetze. The details of this
argument are carried out in §6 where our Main Theorem 2.9 is finally established.
This paper is the first in a series of three papers – the other two being [42], [41]– which
collectively constitute a sequel to the Basic Law V components of our paper [40]. In that
earlier paper [40], we gave a proof of the consistency of Frege’s Grundgesetze system with
limited amounts of comprehension using tools from hyperarithmetic theory. However, we
were unable to use these models to ascertain how much Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory could
be consistently done in the Fregean setting. The work in this paper explains why this was
the case. The key to this was an axiom known as Axiom Beta (cf. Definition 4.2), which
effectively ensures that the Mostowski Collapse Theorem holds in a structure. As one can
see by inspection of the proofs in §6, it is being able to invoke this theorem in a model
which allows us to obtain finally the Main Theorem 2.9. It turns out that the usual models
associated to hyperarithmetic theory simply are not models of Axiom Beta.
This present paper does not depend on results from our earlier paper [40], nor does
it depend on its two thematically-linked companion papers, [41], [42]. In the companion
paper [41], we use the constructible hierarchy to develop models of an intensional type
theory, roughly analogous to how one can use the cumulative hierarchy to build models of
an extensional type theory. This intensional type theory can in turn interpret fragments of
the Grundgesetze system, and so stands to the predicative Grundgesetze system as the stage
axioms of Shoenfield [35, 36, 37] and Boolos [3] stands to the Zermelo-Fraenkel system. In
the other companion paper [42], we examine the deductive strength of the theory consisting
of all the predicative abstraction principles whose consistency we establish here.
3
2 The Grundgesetze and Its Set Theory
Basic Law V is the crucial fifth axiom of Frege’s Grundgesetze ([15], [17]), and it axiomatizes
the behavior of a certain type-lowering operator from second-order entities to first-order
entities, called the “extension operator.” In Frege’s type-theory, the second-order entities
are called “concepts” while the first-order entities are called “objects,” so that the extension
operator ∂ takes a concept X and returns an object ∂(X). (There is no standard notation
for the extension operator, and so some authors write §(X) in lieu of ∂(X)). Basic Law V
then simply postulates that the extension operator is injective:
(2.1) Basic Law V: ∀ X, Y (∂(X) = ∂(Y )↔ X = Y )
Here the identity of concepts is regarded as extensional in character, so that two con-
cepts X, Y are said to be identical precisely when they are coextensive, i.e. X = Y if and
only if for all objects z we have that Xz if and only if Y z.
Models of Basic Law V have the following form:
(2.2) M = (M,S1(M), S2(M), . . . , ∂)
wherein M is a non-empty set that serves as the interpretation of the objects, and the
set Sn(M) ⊆ P (Mn) serves as the interpretation of the n-ary concepts, and wherein the func-
tion ∂ : S1(M)→ M is an injection. Further, we assume that in the object-language of the
structure from equation (2.2) we have the resources to describe when an n-tuple (a1, . . . , an)
from Mn is in an n-ary concept R from Sn(M), and we write this in the object-language alter-
natively as R(a1, . . . , an) or (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R, and we refer to this relation as the predication
relation.
As is well-known, Basic Law V is inconsistent with the full second-order comprehension
schema:
Definition 2.1. The Full Comprehension Schema consists of the all axioms of the form
∃ R ∀ a (Ra↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula, perhaps with parameters,
and x abbreviates (x1, . . . , xn) and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not
appear free in ϕ(x).
In spite of this inconsistency, Parsons and Heck ([31], [21]) showed that Basic Law V is
consistent with the version of the comprehension schema in which ϕ(x) contains no second-
order quantifiers:
Definition 2.2. The First-Order Comprehension Schema consists of all axioms of the form
∃ R ∀ a (Ra ↔ ϕ(a)), wherein ϕ(x) is allowed to be any formula with no second-order
quantifiers but perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x1, . . . , xn) and R is an n-ary
concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear free in ϕ(x).
Ferreira and Wehmeier extended the Parsons-Heck result by showing that there are mod-
els M = (M,D(M), D(M2), . . . , ∂) of Basic Law V which also model stronger forms of
comprehension, namely the ∆11-comprehension schema and the Σ
1
1-choice schema ([14] §4).
These schemata are defined as follows:
4
Definition 2.3. The ∆11-Comprehension Schema consists of all axioms of the form
(2.3) ∀ x (ϕ(x)↔ ψ(x))→ ∃ R ∀ a (Ra↔ ϕ(a))
wherein ϕ(x) is a Σ11-formula and ψ(x) is a Π
1
1-formula that may contain parameters, and x
abbreviates (x1, . . . , xn), and R is an n-ary concept variable for n ≥ 1 that does not appear
free in ϕ(x) or ψ(x).
Definition 2.4. The Σ11-Choice Schema consists of all axioms of the form
(2.4) [∀ x ∃ R′ ϕ(x,R′)]→ ∃ R [∀ x ∀ R′ [(∀ y (R′y ↔ Rx y))→ ϕ(x,R′)]]
wherein the formula ϕ(x,R′) is Σ11, perhaps with parameters, and x abbreviates (x1, . . . , xn)
and y abbreviates (y1, . . . , ym) and R is an (n + m)-ary concept variable for n,m ≥ 1 that
does not appear free in ϕ(x,R′) where R′ is an m-ary concept variable.
Here, as is usual, a Σ11-formula (resp. Π
1
1-formula) is one which begins with a block of
existential quantifiers (resp. universal quantifiers) over n-ary concepts for various n ≥ 1
and which contains no further second-order quantifiers. Given this variety of comprehension
schemata, it becomes expedient to explicitly distinguish between different formal theories
that combine these schemata with the axiom Basic Law V from equation (2.1). In particular,
one defines the following systems (cf. [40] Definition 5 p. 1683):
Definition 2.5. The theory ABL0 is Basic Law V together with the First-Order Comprehen-
sion Schema (cf. Definition 2.2). The theory ∆11-BL0 is Basic Law V together with the ∆
1
1-
Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.3). The theory Σ11-LB0 is Basic Law V together with
the Σ11-Choice Schema (cf. Definition 2.4) and the First-Order Comprehension Schema (cf.
Definition 2.2).
We opt to designate the subsystem formed with Σ11-Choice by inverting the letters “BL”
to “LB”, since this convention saves us from needing to write out the word “choice” when
referring to a theory, and since it is compatible with the convention in subsystems of second-
order arithmetic ([39]), wherein the ∆11-comprehension fragment is called ∆
1
1-CA0 and the Σ
1
1-
choice fragment is called Σ11-AC0.
In the companion paper [42], we work deductively in theories containing limited amounts
of comprehension. In these situations, it will prove expedient to consider an enrichment of
the above theories by the addition of certain function symbols. In particular, we assume
that for every m,n > 0 we have a (n + 1)-ary function symbol in the language for the
map (R, a1, . . . , an) 7→ R[a1, . . . , an] from a single (n + m)-ary relation R and an n-tuple of
objects (a1, . . . , an) to the m-ary relation
(2.5) R[a1, . . . , an] = {(y1, . . . , ym) : R(a1, . . . , an, y1, . . . , ym)}
One benefit of the addition of these symbols is that it allows for a compact formalization of
the key clause (2.4) of the Σ11-choice schema, namely:
(2.6) [∀ x ∃ R′ ϕ(x,R′)]→ [∃ R ∀ x ϕ(x,R[x])]
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The addition of these function symbols to the signature impacts the axiom system because
we continue to assume that we have Σ11-choice and first-order comprehension. In particular,
the inclusion of the function symbols (R, a1, . . . , an) 7→ R[a1, . . . , an] in the signature then
adds to the collection of terms of the signature, which in turn adds to the collection of
quantifier-free and hence first-order formulas of the signature.
Let us call this expansion of Σ11-LB0 the system Σ
1
1-LB, i.e. we drop the “zero” subscript;
and likewise for the other systems from Definition 2.2. For ease of future reference, let’s
explicitly record this in the following definition:
Definition 2.6. The theory ABL is Basic Law V together with the First-Order Comprehension
Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) in the signature including the function symbols (R, a1, . . . , an) 7→
R[a1, . . . , an]. The theory ∆
1
1-BL is Basic Law V together with the ∆
1
1-Comprehension Schema
(cf. Definition 2.3) in the signature with these function symbols. The theory Σ11-LB is Basic
Law V together with the Σ11-Choice Schema (cf. Definition 2.4) and the First-Order Com-
prehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) in the signature including these function symbols.
In building models of these consistent fragments of Frege’s system, one of our chief aims
is to understand how much set theory can be thereby recovered. The crucial idea is to define
an ersatz membership-relation η in terms of the extension operator and predication:
(2.7) aηb⇐⇒ ∃ B (∂(B) = b & Ba)
Since the extensions are precisely the objects in the range of the extension operator ∂, we
write the collection of extensions as rng(∂). Now it follows from considerations related to
the Russell paradox that rng(∂) is not a concept in the presence of ∆11-comprehension (cf.
[40] Proposition 29 p. 1692). In contrast to rng(∂), the collections V = {x : x = x}
and ∅ = {x : x 6= x} do form concepts since they are first-order definable. The following
elementary proposition, provable in Σ11-LB, says that for subconcepts of rng(∂), the η-relation
restricted to this concept exists as a binary concept:
Proposition 2.7. (Existence of Restricted η-relation) (Σ11-LB) For every concept X ⊆ rng(∂)
there is a binary concept R such that for all a, we have that Xa implies ∂(R[a]) = a. So for
all concepts X ⊆ rng(∂) there is a binary relation EX ⊆ V ×X such that Xa implies: EX(b, a)
iff bηa.
It will also be helpful in what follows to have some fixed notation for subset and successor.
So similar to equation (2.7) we define the associated Fregean subset relation ⊆η as follows:
(2.8) a ⊆η b⇐⇒ ∀ c (cηa→ cηb)
However, note that if a is not an extension, then cηa is always false and so (cηa → ψ) is
always true, regardless of what ψ is. Hence, if a is not an extension, then a ⊆η b is always
true. So the expressions aηb and a ⊆η b will behave like membership and subset only if
one restricts attention to a, b, that are extensions. In what follows, it will also be useful to
introduce some notation for a successor-like operation on extensions. So let us say that
(2.9) σ(x) = y ⇐⇒ ∃ F ∃ G [∂(F ) = x & ∂(G) = y & ∀ z (Gz ↔ (Fz ∨ z = x))]
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However, this function is not total, and in particular it should be emphasized that σ(x) is only
well-defined when x is an extension. Accordingly, the graph of the function x 7→ σ(x) does not
exist as a binary concept, since if it did, then its domain would likewise exist, and its domain is
precisely rng(∂). However, when σ(x) is defined, note that it satisfies zη(σ(x)) iff either zηx
or z = x. This of course reminds us of the usual set-theoretic successor operation x 7→
(x ∪ {x}).
In the axiomatic development of systems related to Σ11-LB, the crucially important concept
is the notion of transitive closure. If F is a concept, then let us say that F is η-transitive or
η-closed if (Fx & yηx) implies Fy, for all x, y. Then we define transitive closure as follows:
(2.10) (Trclη(x))(y) ≡ ∀ F [F is η-transitive & x ⊆η ∂(F )]→ Fy
It is easily provable that Trclη(x) also has the following properties:
Proposition 2.8. (Elementary Facts about Transitive Closure)
1. Transitive Closure is η-transitive: [(Trclη(x))(y) ∧ zηy] implies (Trclη(x))(z).
2. Transitive Closure is an η-superclass: wηx implies (Trclη(x))(w).
So now we may describe the procedure for carving out a model of a fragment of classical
set theory ZFC from a model ofM of Σ11-LB. Since the foundation axiom is a traditional part
of ZFC, we want to ensure that our fragments always include this axiom, and for this purpose it
is important that we avoid infinite descending η-chains. SinceM has second-order resources,
this can be effected in a straightforward manner. In particular, if X ⊆ M and R ⊆ X × X
areM-definable (but not necessarily elements of Sk(M)), then let us say that “(X ,R) is well-
founded in M” ifM models that every non-empty subconcept of X has an R-least member,
i.e. M models ∀ F [∃ x Fx & ∀ x (Fx → X (x))] → [∃ y Fy & ∀ z (Fz → ¬R(z, y))].
A special case of this is when X is a concept and R is a binary concept, in which case we
likewise define “(X,R) is well-founded inM” to mean thatM models that every non-empty
subconcept of X has an R-least element, i.e that M models
(2.11) ∀ F [∃ x Fx & ∀ x (Fx→ Xx)]→ [∃ y Fy & ∀ z (Fz → ¬R(z, y))]
Since S1(M) is in general a small subset of P (M), we of course need to be wary of inferring
from “(X,R) is well-founded in M” to (X,R) having no infinite descending R-chains, or
to (X,R) having no infinite M-definable descending R-chains.
Finally, putting this all together, let us define the notion of a “well-founded extension”:
wfExt(x) ≡ x is an extension & (Trclη(σ(x)), η) is well-founded
& (Trclη(σ(x)) ⊆ rng(∂)(2.12)
Given a model M of Σ11-LB, let us define its collection of well-founded extensions as follows:
(2.13) wfExt(M) = {x ∈M :M |= wfExt(x)}
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In broad analogy with its usage in set theory, we shall sometimes refer to this as the inner
model of well-founded extensions relative to a model of Σ11-LB.
The other definition that we need in order to state and prove our results is a global
choice principle. Suppose that T is a theory in one of our signatures. Then we let T + GC
be the expansion of T by a new binary relation symbol < on objects in the signature, with
axioms saying that < is a linear order of the first-order objects, and we additionally have a
schema in the expanded signature saying that any instantiated formula ϕ(x) in the expanded
signature, perhaps containing parameters, that holds of some first-order object x will hold
of a <-least element:
(2.14) [∃ x ϕ(x)]→ [∃ x ϕ(x) & ∀ y < x ¬ϕ(y)]
Since all our theories T contain first-order comprehension (cf. Definition 2.2), and since
instances of < are quantifier-free and hence first-order, we have that the graph of < forms
a binary concept in T + GC. Of course the postulated binary relation < does not necessarily
have anything to do with the usual “less than” relation on the natural numbers.
With this all notation in place, our main theorem can be expressed as follows, wherein P
denotes the power set axiom:
Theorem 2.9. (Main Theorem) There is a modelM of Σ11-LB+GC such that (wfExt(M), η)
satisfies the axioms of ZFC-P.
This result is proven at the close of §6. It is significant primarily because it shows us what
kind of set theory may be consistently developed if one takes Basic Law V as a primitive.
Now, one subtlety should be mentioned here at the outset: in the absence of power set,
it is not entirely obvious which form of replacement and which form of choice is optimal.
The discussion in Gitman-Hamkins-Johnstone ([19]) suggests that instead of the replacement
schema one should use the collection schema, and as for the axiom of choice one should use
the principle that every set can be well-ordered; the reason in each case being that these are
the deductively stronger principles in the absence of powerset. (For a formal statement of the
collection schema, cf. equation (4.2)). As we will note when establishing our main theorem
in §6, our models satisfy these principles as well. Hence, for the sake of concreteness, in this
paper we may define ZFC-P as follows:
Definition 2.10. ZFC-P is the theory consisting of extensionality, pairing, union, infinity,
separation, collection, foundation, and the statement that every set can be well-ordered.
For precise definitions of these axioms, one may consult any standard set theory textbook
([29, 30], [25]; and for the collection schema see again equation (4.2)).
The Main Theorem 2.9 is a natural analogue of the work of Boolos, Hodes, and Cook’s
on the axiom “New V” ([4], [23], [7]). This is the axiom in the signature of Basic Law V,
but where, for the sake of disambiguation, we write the type-lowering operator with the
symbol ∂′ as opposed to ∂. The axiom New V then says that
(2.15) New V : ∀ X, Y (∂′(X) = ∂′(Y )↔ ((Small(X) ∨ Small(Y ))→ X = Y ))
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Here Small(X) is an abbreviation for the statement that X is not bijective with the universe
of first-order objects {x : x = x}. So ifM = (M,S1(M), S2(M), . . . , ∂′) is a model of New V,
thenM |= Small(X) if and only if there’s no bijection f : X →M whose graph is in S2(M).
To see the connection between New V and ZFC, recall that for a cardinal κ, the set Hκ
is defined as Hκ = {x : |trcl(x)| < κ} (cf. [29] §IV.6 pp. 130 ff, [30] p. 78, [25] p. 171).
Suppose that κ > ω is regular and satisfies |Hκ| = κ. In this circumstance, let us define:
(2.16) Hκ = (Hκ, P (Hκ), P (Hκ ×Hκ), . . . , ∂′)
where ∂′(X) = 〈1, X〉 if |X| < κ and ∂′(X) = 〈0, 0〉 otherwise (wherein 〈·, ·〉 is the usual
set-theoretic pairing function). Then in analogue to Frege’s definition of membership in
equation (2.7), we can define a quasi-membership relation η′ in models of New V as follows:
(2.17) aη′b⇐⇒ ∃ B (Small(B) & ∂′(B) = b & Ba)
Likewise, we can define wfExt′ using the relation η′ just as wfExt is defined in equation (2.12)
using the relation η. Then one may prove that Hκ is a model of New V and (wfExt′(Hκ), η′)
is isomorphic to (Hκ,∈), which is known to model ZFC-P when κ > ω is regular (cf. [29]
Theorem IV.6.5 p. 132, [30] Theorem II.2.1 p. 109, [25] p. 171). Hence one has following:
Proposition 2.11. There is a modelM of New V and the Full Comprehension Schema (cf.
Definition 2.1) such that (wfExt′(M), η′) satisfies the axioms of ZFC-P (cf. Definition 2.10).
The Main Theorem 2.9 establishes an analogous result for Basic Law V in the setting of
limited amounts of comprehension.
3 Predicative Abstraction Principles
The axioms Basic Law V and New V are examples of what are now called abstraction
principles. If E(R, S) is a formula of second-order logic with exactly two free n-ary relation
variables for some n ≥ 1 then the abstraction principle A[E] associated to E is the following
axiom in a signature expanded by a new function symbol ∂E from n-ary relations to objects:
(3.1) A[E] : ∀ R, S, [∂E(R) = ∂E(S)↔ E(R, S)]
Abstraction principles have been studied extensively for many decades. For an introduction
to this subject, see Burgess [6], and for many important papers, see the collections edited
by Demopoulos [9] and Cook [8].
The first thing that one observes in this subject is that some abstraction principles
are consistent with the Full Comprehension Schema in their signature (cf. Definition 2.1)
while others are not. For instance, we saw above that New V is consistent with the Full
Comprehension Schema in its signature, while Basic Law V (2.1) itself is not. Given that
Basic Law V is consistent with weaker forms of comprehension, one may ask whether there
is any general method for determining whether the abstraction principle A[E] is consistent
with these weaker forms of comprehension. In answering this question, it’s helpful to have
specific names for the theories consisting of combinations of the abstraction principle A[E]
with the weaker forms of comprehension:
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Definition 3.1. For each formula E(R, S) with exactly two free nE-ary variables R, S for a
specific nE ≥ 1, let the theory ∆11-A[E] (resp. Σ11-[E]A) consist of A[E] from equation (3.1) plus
the ∆11-Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.3) in the signature containing the function
symbol ∂E (resp. A[E] from equation (3.1) plus the Σ
1
1-Choice Schema (cf. Definition 2.4)
and the First-Order Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) in the signature containing
the function symbol ∂E).
Further, let us define a theory of pure second-order logic in a very limited signature:
Definition 3.2. The theory SO is the second-order theory consisting of the Full Compre-
hension Schema (2.1) in the signature of pure second-order logic bereft of all type-lowering
function symbols.
Here the abbreviation “SO” is chosen because it reminds us of “second-order logic.” It’s worth
emphasizing that while the theory SO has full comprehension in its signature, its signature is
very impoverished and does not include any of the type-lowering function symbols featuring
in abstraction principles. But as with the fragments of Basic Law V discussed in the previous
sections, we’re assuming that we have the function symbols (a,R) 7→ R[a] from equation (2.5)
in the signature of all our theories, including SO. So just to be clear: the signature of SO
consists merely of the predication relations Rx and the maps (a,R) 7→ R[a], and its axioms
consist solely of the extensionality axioms and the instances of the Full Comprehension
Schema (2.1) in its signature. Sometimes in what follows we consider the extension SO+ GC,
which per the discussion of global choice in the previous section adds to the signature of SO
a binary relation on objects and posits that it is a well-order. In the theory SO + GC, we
adopt the convention that instances of the Full Comprehension Schema (2.1) may include
the global well-order.
One of our chief results on the consistency of abstraction principles with predicative levels
of comprehension is the following:
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that n ≥ 1 and that E(R, S) is a formula in the signature of SO+GC
which is provably an equivalence relation on n-ary concepts in SO+GC. Then Σ11-[E]A+SO+GC
is consistent.
This result is proven in §5 below. This result indicates that the fact that Basic Law V is
consistent with the ∆11-comprehension schema and Σ
1
1-choice schema is not an isolated phe-
nomena, but follows from the fact that E(X, Y ) ≡ X = Y is provably an equivalence relation
in SO+GC. It’s worth stressing that the theory T = Σ11-[E]A+SO+GC has full comprehension
for formulas in the signature of SO+GC but only has predicative comprehension for formulas
in T ’s full signature which includes the type-lowering function ∂E.
A related problem of long-standing interest has been the “joint consistency problem.”
This is the problem of determining natural conditions on E1, E2 so that if A[E1] and A[E2]
has a standard model then A[E1] ∧ A[E2] has a standard model. A second-order theory is
said to have a standard model if it has a modelM satisfying Sn(M) = P (Mn) for all n ≥ 1,
where we here employ the notation introduced in the previous section in equation (2.2) for
models. This is a non-trivial problem: for, some A[E1] have standard models M only when
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the underlying first-order domain M is finite, such as when E1(X, Y ) is expressive of the
symmetric difference of X and Y being Dedekind-finite (cf. [5] p. 215, [20] pp. 289 ff).
However, other A[E2] have a standard modelM with underlying first-order domain M only
when M is infinite, such as when E2(X, Y ) is expressive of X, Y being bijective.
In the setting of limited amounts of comprehension, the most obvious analogue of the joint
consistency problem is to ask about the extent to which it is consistent that A[E1] ∧ A[E2]
has a model satisfying e.g. the ∆11-comprehension schema when each A[Ei]-individually does.
Formally, let us introduce the following theories:
Definition 3.4. The theory ∆11-A[E1, . . . , Ek] (resp. Σ
1
1-[E1, . . . , Ek]A) consists both of the ab-
straction principles A[E1] ∧ · · · ∧ A[Ek] (3.1) and the ∆11-Comprehension Schema (cf. Def-
inition 2.3) (resp. plus the Σ11-Choice Schema (cf. Definition 2.4) and the First-Order
Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2)) in the signature containing all the function
symbols ∂E1 , . . . , ∂Ek .
Our result Theorem 3.3 from above is a direct consequence of the following theorem,
which indicates that the joint consistency problem does not arise in the setting with limited
amounts of comprehension, assuming that we can prove the formulas are equivalence relations
in SO + GC, and assuming that the equivalence relations are expressible in the signature
of SO + GC:
Theorem 3.5. (Joint Consistency Theorem) Suppose n1, . . . , nk ≥ 1 and that the formu-
las E1(R, S), . . . , Ek(R, S) in the signature of SO + GC are provably equivalence relations
on mi-ary concepts in SO + GC. Then the theory Σ
1
1-[E1, . . . , Ek]A + SO + GC is consistent.
This result is proven in §5 below. It’s worth again underscoring that the theory T =
Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A + SO + GC has full comprehension for formulas in the signature of SO + GC
but only has predicative comprehension for formulas in T ’s full signature which includes the
type-lowering function ∂E1 , . . . , ∂Ek . By compactness, this theorem establishes the consis-
tency of a theory which includes abstraction principles associated to each formula in the
signature of SO + GC which one can prove to be an equivalence relation in SO + GC. In our
companion paper [42], we study the deductive strength of this theory.
4 Constructibility and Generalized Admissibility
The aim of this section is to briefly review several of the tools from constructibility that
we use in the below proofs. Hence, it might be advisable to skip this section on a first
read-through and refer back to this section as needed. In this section, we work entirely
with fragments and extensions of the standard ZFC-set theory, so that all structures M are
structures in the signature of set-theory. The tools which we review and describe in this
section come from constructibility, the study of Go¨del’s universe L (cf. [25] Chapter 13, [29]
Chapter 6, [30] II.6, [10]). This is the union of the sets Lα that are defined recursively as
follows, wherein Defn(M) refers to the subsets of M which are definable with parameters
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(when M is conceived of as having, as its only primitive, the membership relation restricted
to its elements):
(4.1) L0 = ∅, Lα+1 = Defn(Lα), Lα =
⋃
β<α
Lβ for α a limit
One tool which we shall use frequently in this paper is the following natural generalization
of the notion of an admissible ordinal:
Definition 4.1. For n ≥ 1, an ordinal α is Σn-admissible if α a limit and α > ω and Lα
models Σn-collection and Σn−1-separation.
Recall that the collection schema is the following schema:
(4.2) ∀ p [∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, y, p)]→ [∀ u ∃ v (∀ x ∈ u ∃ y ∈ v ϕ(x, y, p))]
By abuse of notation, we also say that Lα is Σn-admissible iff α is Σn-admissible; and we write
“admissible” in lieu of “Σ1-admissible.” The notion of Σn-admissibility can be described
axiomatically as well. In particular, it is not difficult to see that Lα is Σn-admissible if
and only if Lα satisfies extensionality, pairing, union, infinity, the foundation schema, Σn-
collection, and Σn−1-separation. In the case n = 1, this set of axioms provides an equivalent
axiomatization of Kripke-Platek set theory ([28], [32], [10] p. 48, p. 36). Further, the union
of this set of axioms for all n ≥ 1, along with the axiom choice (in the form that every set
can be well-ordered), is deductively equivalent to ZFC-P (cf. Definition 2.10). Finally, an
equivalent definition of Σn-admissibility is as follows: α is Σn-admissible if and only if α is a
limit and α > ω and Lα models Kripke-Platek set theory and Σn-replacement in the strong
form that both the graph and range of Σn-definable functions on sets exists (cf. [38] p. 368,
[33] p. 174).
Several of the classical results about Kripke-Platek set theory easily generalize to Σn-
admissibles. In particular, if Lα is Σn-admissible, then (i) Lα satisfies ∆n-separation, (ii) Lα
models that the Σn- and Πn-formulas are uniformly closed under bounded quantification, and
(iii) Lα satisfies Σn-transfinite recursion. For the proofs of these results for the case n = 1, see
Chapters I-II of Devlin’s book [10]; the proofs for the results n > 1 carry over word-for-word.
An idea closely related to transfinite recursion is Mostowksi Collapse. Since admissible Lα
don’t necessarily model the Mostowksi Collapse Lemma, it is natural to formulate axioms
pertaining directly to the Mostowski Collapse Lemma. In particular, we define:
Definition 4.2. Axiom Beta says that for all sets X,R such that (X,R) is well-founded,
there is a set pi such that pi is a function with domain X satisfying, for each y from X, the
equation pi(y) = {pi(y′) : y′ ∈ X & y′Ry} (cf. Barwise [1] Definition I.9.5 p. 39).
The set-version of the Mostowksi Collapse Lemma holds in admissible Lα which satisfy
Axiom Beta. The set-version of this lemma states that for all sets X,E such that (X,E) is
well-founded and extensional, there is a transitive set M and an isomorphism pi : (X,E)→
(M,∈) (cf. [29] pp. 105-106, [30], [30] p. 56 ff, [25] p. 69). The traditional ZFC-proof
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of Axiom Beta uses Σ1-replacement and Σ1-separation, and so Lα models Axiom Beta for
all Σ2-admissible α.
Other basic properties of the structures Lα relate to its canonical well-ordering <L. The
well-order <L may be taken to be given by a canonical formula that is uniformly ∆1 in
admissible Lα. Further, since <L is uniformly ∆1, we have that this well-order is absolute
between various admissible Lα. Moreover, one has that the function x 7→ pred<L(x) is
uniformly ∆1 in admissibles where we define y ∈ pred<L(x) iff y <L x (cf. Devlin [10] pp.
74-75). Finally, just as the Σm- and Πm-formulas are closed under bounded quantification
for 0 ≤ m ≤ n in Σn-admissibles, so for 0 < m ≤ n they are closed under <L-bounding
in Σn-admissibles.
Other important properties of Σn-admissibles that we shall use are related to uniformiza-
tion. A structure M satisfies Σ˜n-uniformization if for every Σ˜Mn -definable relation R ⊆M × M there is a Σ˜Mn -definable relation R′ ⊆ R such that M |= ∀ x [(∃ y R(x, y)) →(∃! y R′(x, y))]. In this case, R′ is called a Σ˜Mn -definable uniformization of R. In his famouspaper, Jensen showed that admissible Lα are models of Σ˜n-uniformization for all n ≥ 1(cf. [26] Theorem 3.1 p. 256 and Lemma 2.15 p. 255; [10] Theorem 4.5 p. 269). The proof
of this theorem is very difficult, and in fact holds for all members Jα of Jensen’s alternate
hierarchy. However, in what follows we can avoid direct appeal to Jensen’s Theorem by ap-
pealing to the following weak version, whose elementary proof proceeds by choosing <L-least
witnesses:
Proposition 4.3. ( Weak Uniformization) Suppose n ≥ 1. If Lα is Σn-admissible then Lα
satisfies Σ˜m-uniformization for every 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Moreover, the parameters in the Σm-definition of the uniformization R′ can be taken to be the same as the parameters in the Σm-
definition of R.
Let’s finally state a simple consequence of uniformization that we shall appeal to repeatedly
in what follows:
Proposition 4.4. (Proposition on Right-Inverting a Surjection) Suppose that n ≥ 1 and
that Lα is Σn-admissible. Suppose that Y is a Σ˜Lαn -definable subset of Lα and X is a subsetof Lα. Suppose there is a Σ˜Lαn -definable surjection pi : Y → X. Then X is a Σ˜Lαn -definablesubset of Lα and there is a Σ˜Lαn -definable injection ι : X → Y satisfying pi ◦ ι = idX .
An important concept in what follows is the n-th projectum of the structure Lα. This
was introduced by Kripke ([28]) and Platek ([32]), and it records how small one can possibly
make α under a Σn-definable injection:
Definition 4.5. Suppose that n > 0 and α > ω. Then the n-th projectum ρn(α) = ρn of α
is the least ρ ≤ α such that there is a Σ˜Lαn -definable injection ι : α→ ρ.
There are several different equivalent characterizations of the n-th projectum (cf. [33] p.
157, [1] Definition V.6.1 p. 174, [26] pp. 256-257, [34] Definition 2.1 p. 619). In particular,
for admissible α, the n-th projectum may be equivalently defined as the smallest ρ ≤ α such
that there is a Σ˜Lαn -definable injection ι : Lα → ρ.
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Another basic tool that we employ is the notion of a Σn-elementary substructure. Recall
that if M and N are structures in the signature of ZFC, then M ≺n N is said to hold, and M
is said to be a Σn-elementary substructure of N , if M ⊆ N and for every Σn-formula ϕ(x) and
every tuple of parameters a from M , it is the case that M |= ϕ(a) if and only if N |= ϕ(a).
Here are some basic facts about Σn-elementary substructures and the constructible hierarchy
that we shall use:
Proposition 4.6.
1. The Σn-Definable Closure is a Σn-Elementary Substructure: Suppose that Lα is Σn-
admissible and A ⊆ Lα. Let the Σn-definable closure of Lα with parameters A, writ-
ten dclLαΣn(A), denote the set of elements a of Lα such that there is a Σn-formula ϕ(x, y)
with all free variables displayed and parameters p ∈ A such that Lα |= ϕ(a, p) ∧
∀ a′ (ϕ(a′, p)→ a = a′). Then dclLαΣn(A) ≺n Lα.
2. If κ is an uncountable regular cardinal, then Lκ is a model of ZFC-P (cf. Defini-
tion 2.10).
3. Admissibility and Axiom Beta Preserved Under Elementary Substructure: Suppose
that n ≥ 1 and that Lα ≺n Lβ where β is Σn-admissible. Then α is Σn-admissible.
Further, if Lβ |= Axiom Beta then Lα |= Axiom Beta.
4. Consequence of V=L for Σ1-Substructures of L up to a Successor Cardinal: Suppose
that V=L and λ is an infinite cardinal and λ ∪ {λ} ⊆ M , M ≺1 Lλ+, |M | = λ.
Then M = Lγ for some γ with |γ| = λ.
Proof. For the first item, see Devlin [10] Lemma II.5.3 p. 83 which proves the result for n = ω;
the same proof works for 1 ≤ n < ω. For the next item on ZFC-P, see [29] p. 177, [30]
Lemma II.6.22 p. 139, [25] p. 198, noting that these same proofs also give one the collection
schema from the official definition of ZFC-P (cf. Definition 2.10). The proof of the third
item follows from a routine induction. For the fourth and final item, see Devlin [10] Lemma
II.5.10 p. 85 for the special case λ = ω; the same proof works for the general case.
5 Construction and Existence Theorems, and Joint Con-
sistency Problem
The aim of this section is to build models of abstraction principles with predicative amounts
of comprehension, and these yield our solution to the joint consistency problem described
at the close of §3. The first step is the following construction. This construction is also an
important part of the proof of our Main Theorem 2.9, whose proof is presented in the next
section §6. In the statement of this construction theorem, the key concepts of Σn-admissible
and n-th projectum ρn were defined in the previous section §4. Likewise, recall that the
theories SO and Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A were defined respectively in Definition 3.2 and Definition 3.4
from §3.
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Theorem 5.1. ( Construction Theorem). Suppose that n ≥ 1 and that α is Σn-admissible
with ρn(α) = ρ < α and let ι : Lα → ρ be a witnessing Σ˜Lαn -definable injection. Thenconsider the following structure M in the signature of SO (cf. Definition 3.2):
(5.1) M = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . .)
Further, suppose for each i ∈ [1, k], the relation Ei is a Σ˜1,Mn-1 -definable equivalence relationon (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα).
Then consider the Σ˜Lαn -definable maps ∂Ei : (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα) → ρ defined by ∂Ei(X) =ι(`i(X)) where `i(X) is the <L-least member of X’s Ei-equivalence class. Then the following
expansion of M is a model of the theory Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A + GC, where the global well-order <
on objects is given by the membership relation on the ordinal ρ:
(5.2) N = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . . , ∂E1 , . . . , ∂Ek , <)
Proof. For each i ∈ [1, k], define
(5.3) Êi = {(X, Y ) ∈ (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα)× (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα) :M |= Ei(X, Y )}
Then since Ei is Σ˜1,Mn-1 -definable, it follows that Êi is Σ˜Lαn-1-definable, so that Êi is a Σ˜Lαn-1-definable equivalence relation on (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα). For each element X of (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα),
let [X]Êi ⊆ (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα) denote the Êi-equivalence class of X. Then `i : (P (ρmi) ∩ Lα)→
(P (ρmi)∩Lα) is defined by `i(X) = min<L([X]Êi), and its graph has the following definition:
`i(X) = Y ⇐⇒ X, Y ∈ Lα & X, Y ⊆ ρmi & Êi(X, Y )(5.4)
& ∀Z <L Y [Z ⊆ ρmi → ¬Êi(X,Z)]
Since adding quantifiers bounded by <L to Σm- or Πm-formulas for m ≤ n does not increase
their complexity, we have that the graph of `i is defined by the conjunction of a Σ˜Lαn-1-
formula with a Π˜Lαn-1-formula and so is Σ˜Lαn -definable. Then the map ∂Ei : (P (ρmi)∩Lα)→ ρ
is defined by ∂Ei(X) = ι(`i(X)), which is likewise Σ˜Lαn -definable since it is the composition
of two Σ˜Lαn -definable functions. (Note that in the case n = 1, the function `i is defined
by the conjunction of a Σ˜Lα0 -formula with a Σ˜Lα1 -formula and so is Σ˜Lα1 -definable. For,
the formula ∀ Z <L Y θ(Z, Y ) for any Σ˜Lα0 -definable θ(Z, Y ) is equivalent to the formula∃ Y ′ Y ′ = pred<L(Y ) & ∀ Z ∈ Y ′ θ(Z, Y ) which is Σ˜Lα1 -definable because the map Y 7→
pred<L(Y ) is ∆˜Lα1 -definable).Now let us argue that the so-defined structure N from equation (5.2) satisfies the ab-
straction principle A[Ei] (3.1). First suppose that N |= ∂Ei(X) = ∂Ei(Y ) for some X, Y ∈
(P (ρmi) ∩ Lα). Then since ι : Lα → ρ is an injection we have that `i(X) = `i(Y ), so
that min<L([X]Êi) = min<L([Y ]Êi). Hence Êi(X, Y ) so that M |= Ei(X, Y ) and hence its
expansionN also models this. Conversely, suppose that N |= Ei(X, Y ), so that its reductM
also models this. Then Êi(X, Y ) and hence [X]Êi = [Y ]Êi and min<L([X]Êi) = min<L([Y ]Êi),
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so that `i(X) = `i(Y ) and hence ∂Ei(X) = ∂Ei(Y ). Hence in fact the structure N from equa-
tion (5.2) satisfies the abstraction principle A[Ei].
So now it remains to show that the structure N from equation (5.2) satisfies the First-
Order Comprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) and the Σ11-Choice Schema (cf. Defini-
tion 2.4) in the expanded signature containing the function symbols ∂E1 , . . . , ∂Ek . First let us
establish a preliminary result that any Σ˜1,N1 -definable subset of N is Σ˜Lαn -definable (indeed,in the same parameters). This result is proven by induction on the complexity of the formula
defining the subset of N . By a subset of the many-sorted structure N , we mean any subset
of any finite product S1×· · ·×Sn, wherein Si is one of the sorts ρ, P (ρ)∩Lα, P (ρ×ρ)∩Lα, . . .
of the structure N as displayed in equation (5.2). So our preliminary result establishes not
only that Σ˜1,N1 -definable subsets of the first-order part ρ are Σ˜Lαn -definable, but also that e.g.
Σ˜1,N1 -definable subsets of ρ× (P (ρ) ∩ Lα) are Σ˜Lαn -definable.As a base case, we show that any subset of N defined by an atomic formula is ∆˜Lαn -definable. Recall that an unnested atomic formula in a signature is one of the form x = y,
c = y, f(x) = y or Px, where c, f, P are respectively constant symbols, function symbols,
and relation symbols of the signature (cf. [24] p. 58). Then in N , any atomic formula ϕ is
equivalent to both a Σ˜1,N1 -formula ϕ∃ ≡ ∃ R ∃ y ϕ∃0 and a Π˜1,N1 -formula ϕ∀ ≡ ∀ R ∀ y ϕ∀0 inwhich ϕ∃0 and ϕ∀0 are quantifer-free and in which any atomic subformula of them is unnested
(cf. [24] Theorem 2.6.1 p. 58). Now, the unnested atomics of the signature of N are
∂Ei(R) = x, R[x] = S, Ry, and x = y. The first is by construction Σ˜Lαn -definable and thelast three are trivially Σ˜Lαn -definable. Further, their negations are likewise Σ˜Lαn -definable:for instance, ∂Ei(R) 6= x iff ∃ y ∈ ρ (∂Ei(R) = y & y 6= x), and Σn-formulas are closed
under bounded quantification in Lα. Now, without loss of generality, we may assume that
the negations in ϕ∃0 and ϕ
∀
0 are all pushed to the inside, so that they apply only to unnested
atomics. Then since the Σn-formulas are closed under finite union and intersection in Lα, we
have that each subformula of ϕ∃0 and ϕ
∀
0 is Σ˜Lαn -definable and thus so are they themselves.By the same reasoning, this holds true for their negations ¬ϕ∃0 and ¬ϕ∀0 as well. Since ϕ∃
is formed from ϕ∃0 by adding a single block of existential quantifiers, we have that ϕ
∃ is
Σ˜Lαn -definable. Since ¬(ϕ∀) is formed from ¬(ϕ∀0) by adding a single block of existentialquantifiers, we have that ¬(ϕ∀) is Σ˜Lαn -definable, so that ϕ∀ is Π˜Lαn -definable. Since theoriginal atomic formula ϕ is equivalent to both ϕ∃ and ϕ∀, we have that the original atomic
formula ϕ is indeed ∆˜Lαn -definable.
Then we show that any Σ˜1,N1 -definable subset of N is Σ˜Lαn -definable by a straightforwardinduction. We may again assume that all the negations are pushed to the inside and apply
only to atomics. And the atomics and negated atomics are Σ˜Lαn -definable by the previousparagraph. Since Σ˜Lαn -definability is closed under finite union and intersection, the inductionsteps for conjunction and disjunction are trivial. Likewise, the induction steps for first-
order quantification hold because first-order quantification in N corresponds to bounded
quantification over elements of ρ in Lα, and the Σn-formulas are closed under bounded
quantification in Lα. So the inductive argument up this point establishes the result for
formulas with no higher-order quantifiers. But since we’re restricting to the case of Σ1,N1 -
definable subsets, the addition of a block of higher-order existential quantifiers ranging over
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P (ρk) ∩ L(α) does not bring us out of the complexity class Σ˜Lαn .
Hence indeed any Σ˜1,N1 -definable subset of N is Σ˜Lαn -definable. From this, the First-OrderComprehension Schema (cf. Definition 2.2) follows directly from ∆n-separation in Lα. As
for the Σ11-choice schema, suppose that N |= ∀ x ∃ R ϕ(x,R), wherein ϕ is Σ11. Choose
a Σ˜n-formula ψ such that for all x ∈ ρ and R ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα) one has N |= ϕ(x,R) iffLα |= ψ(x,R). Then one has that Lα |= ∀x ∈ ρ ∃ R ⊆ ρ ψ(x,R). Define Γ(x,R) ≡ [x ∈
ρ & R ∈ (P (ρ)∩Lα) & Lα |= ψ(x,R)]. By weak uniformization (4.3), choose a ΣLαn -definable
uniformization Γ′ of Γ. Since Γ′ : ρ → (P (ρ) ∩ Lα), it follows from Σn-replacement that its
graph is an element of Lα, and obviously we have Lα |= ∀ x ∈ ρ ψ(x,Γ′(x)). Then define
R′xy if and only if y ∈ Γ′(x), so that R′ ∈ (P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα) and R′[x] = Γ(x). Then one has
Lα |= ∀ x ∈ ρ ψ(x,R′[x]) and hence N |= ϕ(x,R′[x]).
As for the global choice principle GC, we may briefly note that N obviously satisfies
it when we use the ordinary ordering < on the ordinal ρ as the witness. For, since the
ordering < on ρ is ∆0-definable, it exists in P (ρ× ρ)∩Lα by ∆0-separation on the set ρ× ρ
in Lα. In the previous paragraphs, we have verified that various forms of comprehension
hold on N , in which parameters are allowed to occur. Hence these forms of comprehension
continue to hold when < is permitted to occur within the formulas because we can view this
as simply yet another parameter.
Theorem 5.2. ( Existence Theorem). Let γ ≥ 0 and let λ = ωLγ and κ = ωLγ+1. Then for
each n ≥ 1 there is an Σn-admissible αn such that
(5.5) λ < αn < κ, ρn(αn) = λ, Lαn ≺n Lκ, Lαn |= Axiom Beta
More specifically, we can choose αn so that Lαn = dcl
Lκ
Σn
(λ ∪ {λ}). Further, the following
set Fn ⊆ λ is ΣLαn1 -definable, wherein 〈·, ·〉 : λ × λ → λ is Go¨del’s Σ1-definable pairing
function and Form(Σn) is the set of Go¨del numbers of Σn-formulas:
(5.6) Fn = {〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉 : ϕ(x, y, z) ∈ Form(Σn) & β < λ}
Moreover, there is a Σ˜Lαnn surjective partial map θn : Fn 99K Lαn such that
θn(〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉) = a =⇒Lαn |= ϕ(a, β, λ)(5.7)
(Lαn |= ∃ ! x ϕ(x, β, λ)) =⇒ 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉 ∈ dom(θn)
and a Σ˜Lαnn -definable injection ιn : Lαn → dom(θn) such that θn ◦ ιn is the identity on Lαn.Further, the sequence αn is strictly increasing. Finally, for each n ≥ 1 there is an injec-
tion χn : λ→ θ−1n ({0, 1}) whose graph is in Lαn.
Proof. Since the result is absolute, we may assume V=L, and hence we may assume that λ
and κ are cardinals. Since κ is regular uncountable one has that Lκ |= ZFC-P (cf. Proposi-
tion 4.6, item 2). Let M = dclLκΣn(λ∪{λ}). Since the Σn-definable closure is a Σn-elementary
substructure (cf. Proposition 4.6, item 1), we have M ≺n Lκ. Since κ = λ+ and λ∪{λ} ⊆M
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and M ≺1 Lλ+ , it follows from the consequence of V=L for Σ1-substructures of L up to a suc-
cessor cardinal (Proposition 4.6 item 4) that M = Lαn where |αn| = λ. Then λ ≤ αn < κ.
But since λ ∈ M = Lαn we have λ < αn < κ. By Proposition 4.6 item 3, we also have
that Lαn is Σn-admissible and satisfies Axiom Beta.
Then define the following relation Rn ⊆ Fn × Lαn by
(5.8) Rn(〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉, a)⇐⇒ 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉 ∈ Fn & Lαn |= ϕ(a, β, λ)
Then by the definability of partial satisfaction predicates, Rn is Σ˜Lαnn -definable. Then by
weak uniformization (Proposition 4.3), choose a Σ˜Lαnn -definable uniformization θn : Fn 99KLαn of Rn. Then θn is a surjective partial function. For, suppose that a ∈ Lαn . Since Lαn =
dclLκΣn(λ ∪ {λ}), there is Σn-formula ϕ(x, y, z) and β < λ such that
(5.9) Lαn |= ϕ(a, β, λ) & [∀ x (ϕ(x, β, λ)→ x = a)]
Then Lαn |= ∃ x ϕ(x, β, λ) and 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉 is in Fn. Then on the input u = 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉,
we have that θn(u) is defined and if θn(u) = a
′ then Lαn |= ϕ(a′, β, λ). But in conjunction
with equation (5.9), it thus follows that a = a′ = θn(u). Hence, indeed θn : Fn 99K Lαn
is a surjective partial function. Let F ′n ⊆ Fn be the domain of θn, which is likewise Σ˜Lαnn -definable. By the Proposition on Right-Inverting a Surjection (Proposition 4.4), it follows
that there is a Σ˜Lαnn -definable injection ιn : Lαn → F ′n such that θn◦ιn = idLαn . Since Fn ⊆ λ,we then have that ρn(αn) ≤ λ. Since λ is a cardinal and Lαn has cardinality λ, we must
have then that ρn(αn) = λ.
Now we argue that α1 < α2 < α3 < · · · . Since Lαn = dclLκΣn(λ∪{λ}), we have that Lαn ⊆
Lαn+1 and hence that αn ≤ αn+1. Suppose that it was not always that case that αn < αn+1 for
all n ≥ 1. Then αn = αn+1 for some n ≥ 1. Since Lαn+1 is Σn+1-admissible and Lαn = Lαn+1 ,
we have that Lαn is Σn+1-admissible and so satisfies Σn-separation. Hence F ′n ∈ Lαn and
hence by Σn-replacement, the Σ˜Lαnn -definable map θn : F ′n → Lαn would be bounded andthus not surjective.
Finally, we verify that for each n ≥ 1 there is injection χn : λ→ θ−1n ({0, 1}). Let ϕ(x, y, z)
say “x = 0 and y is an ordinal.” Then for each β < λ there is exactly one x in Lαn such
that Lαn |= ϕ(x, β, λ). Then by equation (5.7) we have that 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉 ∈ dom(θn) and
we have by equation (5.7) that θn(〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉) = 0. Then define the function χn : λ→
θ−1n ({0, 1}) by χn(β) = 〈pϕ(x, y, z)q, β〉, which is clearly injective; further clearly the graph
of χ is in Lαn .
The extra information about the injection χn : λ → θ−1n ({0, 1}) in Theorem 5.2 will
be primarily useful for our companion paper [41], where we use constructible sets to build
models of an intensional type theory (cf. §5 of [41]). The reason for the focus on {0, 1} is that
in the tradition of type-theory these are used as ersatzes for the truth-values {F, T}. The
map χn then allows us to inject ordinals β < λ into intensional entities χn(β) which determine
truth-values θn(χn(β)), roughly after the manner in which we inject natural numbers e into
algorithms Pe which determine computable number-theoretic functions ϕe.
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The proofs of these results can be seen as a generalization of our earlier constructions of
models of Σ11-LB0 of the form N = (ω,HYP, . . . , ∂) ([40] Theorem 53 p. 1695). Here HYP
denotes the hyperarithmetic subsets of natural numbers and ∂(Y ) = 〈b, e〉 only if b is a code
for a computable ordinal β and Y is computable from b’s canonical coding Hb of the β-th
Turing jump by the program e. This earlier result can be seen as a special case of these results
by virtue of the fact that if α = ωCK1 then P (ω) ∩ Lα = HYP (cf. Sacks [33] § III.9 Exercise
9.12 p. 87). The primary difference between the proofs here and our earlier constructions of
models of Σ11-LB0 ([40] Theorem 53 p. 1695) was that the latter used Kondoˆ’s Uniformization
Theorem ([39] p. 224, [27] p. 306), while the proof here used uniformization results in the
constructible hierarchy like weak uniformization 4.3. Further, our results here can cover not
just Basic Law V, but the abstraction principles described in §3.
Finally, we can now prove the main results on the consistency of abstraction principles
in the predicative setting, which were first stated and motivated in §3. As for Theorem 3.3,
this is a limiting case of the Joint Consistency Theorem 3.5. So it remains to establish this
latter theorem:
Proof. (of Joint Consistency Theorem 3.5): So suppose that the formulasE1(R, S), . . . , Ek(R, S)
in the signature of SO+ GC are provably equivalence relations on mi-ary concepts in SO+ GC.
The theory SO from Definition 3.2 can be naturally written as the union of theories SOm,
where SOm restricts the instances of the Full Comprehension Schema (2.1) in the signature
of SO + GC to its Σ1m-instances, where this is the standard notion for formulas which be-
gin with m-alternating blocks of quantifiers, the first of which is a block of second-order
existential quantifiers. By compactness, it suffices to show, for each m ≥ 1, that the the-
ory Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A + SOm + GC is consistent.
Let us then fix, for the remainder of this proof, an m ≥ 1. Choose n > m sufficiently
large so that (i) the formulas E1(R, S), . . . , Ek(R, S) are provably equivalence relations in
SOn-1 + GC, and (ii) each of the formulas E1(R, S), . . . , Ek(R, S) is a Σ
1
n-1-formula.
By the Existence Theorem 5.2, choose Σn-admissible α such that ρ = ρ(α) < α and Lα
is a model of Axiom Beta. Then consider the following structure M in the signature of SO,
as was also featured in equation (5.1) of the hypothesis of the Construction Theorem 5.1:
(5.10) M = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . .)
Since α is Σn-admissible, one has that Lα satisfies Σn−1-separation. Thus the structure M
from equation (5.10) satisfies the theory SOn−1 since instances of the Full-Comprehension
Schema (2.1) in the signature of SO associated to Σ1n−1-formulas correspond naturally to Σn−1-
instances of separation in Lα on the set ρ. When expanded by the well-order < on objects
given by the membership relation on ρ, it likewise satisfies the theory SOn−1 + GC. Since the
formulas E1(R, S), . . . , Ek(R, S) are provably equivalence relations on mi-ary concepts in
SOn-1 +GC, it follows that they are likewise a Σ˜1,Mn-1 -definable equivalence relation on P (ρmi)∩Lα. Then by the Construction Theorem, one can build a model of Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A+GC of the
following form, wherein again the global well-order < is given by the membership relation
on ρ:
(5.11) N = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . . , ∂E1 , . . . , ∂Ek , <)
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Since satisfaction of formulas in the signature of M is invariant between it and its expan-
sion N , this model N is the witness to the consistency of Σ11-[E1, . . . , Ek]A + SOm + GC.
6 Identifying the Well-Founded Extensions
The goal of this section is to establish the Main Theorem 2.9. This is done in two steps: (i)
first by identifying in Theorem 6.1 the well-founded extensions within models induced via
the Construction Theorem 5.1 from Lα, and (ii) second in Theorem 6.2 by an identification
within models satisfying Axiom Beta (cf. Definition 4.2). The basic idea of these proofs
is to relate the notion Trclη(x) from §2 equation (2.10) defined in the object-language of a
model of Σ11-LB to the notion trclη(x) defined in the meta-language. In particular, given an
arbitrary relation R, the notion trclR(x) is defined to be the set of all y such that there is a
finite sequence x1, . . . , xn such that x1 = y and xn = x and xmRxm+1 for all m < n. So a
model N of Σ11-LB induces a specific relation η via the definition of the Fregean membership
relation from equation (2.7), and then trclη(x) is defined to be trclR(x) with R = η. Finally,
recall that the well-founded extensions wfExt were defined in (2.12).
Theorem 6.1. ( First Identification of Well-Founded Extensions) Suppose n ≥ 1. Suppose
that Lα is Σn-admissible. Let ρ = ρn(α) and let ∂ : Lα → ρ be a witnessing Σ˜Lαn -definableinjection. Suppose also that ρ < α. Then the structure
(6.1) N = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . . , ∂  (P (ρ) ∩ Lα))
is a model of Σ11-LB + GC, where the global well-order on objects is given by the membership
relation on ρ. Further:
wfExt(N ) = {x ∈ρ : (trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is
∆˜Lαn -well-founded & (trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ rng(∂)}(6.2)
Moreover, there is a Σ˜Lαn -definable embedding j : (Lα,∈)→ (wfExt(N ), η), and its image is:
wfExt∗(N ) = {x ∈ρ : (trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is
well-founded & (trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ rng(∂)}(6.3)
Finally, the isomorphism j : (Lα,∈) → (wfExt∗(N ), η) is the inverse of the Mostowski
collapse pi : (wfExt∗(N ), η)→ (Lα,∈).
For the statement of the Mostowski collapse theorem, see the discussion immediately follow-
ing the definition of Axiom Beta (Definition 4.2).
Proof. By the Construction Theorem 5.1, the structure N is a model of Σ11-LB + GC. Now
we argue for the identity in equation (6.2). To see this identity, let us first show both of the
following, wherein x is an arbitrary element of ρ:
w ∈ trclη(x) =⇒ N |= (Trclη(x))(w)(6.4)
(trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ rng(∂) =⇒ trclη(x) ∈ Lα(6.5)
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For equation (6.4), suppose that w ∈ trclη(x) and suppose that F ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα) is such
that N |= [∀ z (zηx → Fz) & ∀ u, v ((Fv & uηv) → Fu)]. We must show that w ∈ F .
Since w ∈ trclη(x), choose a sequence y1, . . . , yn ∈ ρ such that y1 = w and yn = x and yiηyi+1
for all i < n. Then we may show by induction on 0 < k ≤ n-1 that yn−k ∈ F .
For equation (6.5), first define a map τ : P (ρ)→ P (ρ) by τ(U) = {v ∈ ρ : ∃ w ∈ U vηw}.
Now, it follows from the proposition on the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7)
that the map τ has the property:
[U ∈ Lα & U ⊆ rng(∂)]⇒ ∃ S ∈ (P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα) [∀ w ∈ U ∂(S[w]) = w
& τ(U) = {v ∈ ρ : ∃ w ∈ U v ∈ S[w]} ∈ Lα](6.6)
Let us note one further property of the map τ , namely its connection to transitive closure:
(6.7) U ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα)⇒ trclη(∂(U)) =
∞⋃
n=0
τ (n)(U)
To see this, suppose that U ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα). First consider the left-to-right direction of the
identity. Suppose that y ∈ trclη(∂(U)). Then there are y1, . . . , yn where y1 = y and yn =
∂(U) and yiηyi+1 for i < n. By induction on 0 < k ≤ n-1 we may then show that yn-k ∈
τ (k-1)(U). Second, consider the right-to-left direction of the identity in equation (6.7). For
this one simply shows by induction on n ≥ 0, that τ (n)(U) ⊆ trclη(∂(U)).
Turning now to the verification of equation (6.5), suppose that (trclη(x)∪{x}) ⊆ rng(∂).
Then ∂(X) = x for some X ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα). Now we argue that τ (n)(X) ∈ Lα for all n ≥ 0.
Clearly this holds for n = 0, since by hypothesis one has that τ (0)(X) = X ∈ Lα. Suppose,
for the induction step, that τ (n)(X) ∈ Lα. Then by equation (6.7) we can collect together the
following information: τ (n)(X) ∈ Lα and τ (n)(X) ⊆ trclη(x) ⊆ rng(∂). Then we can deduce
immediately from equation (6.6) that τn+1(X) = τ(τn(X)) ∈ Lα. So now we have finished
arguing that τ (n)(X) ∈ Lα for all n ≥ 0. By appealing repeatedly to the proposition on the
existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7), one has that Lα models that for all n < ω
there is a sequence 〈U0, S0, . . . , Un, Sn〉 of elements of Ui ∈ P (ρ) ∩ Lα, Si ∈ P (ρ × ρ) ∩ Lα
such that U0 = X and
∀ m ≤ n ∀ w ∈ Um ∂(Sm[w]) = w(6.8)
∀ m < n Um+1 = {v ∈ ρ : ∃ w ∈ Um v ∈ Sm[w]}(6.9)
Let n < ω and let 〈U0, S0, . . . , Un, Sn〉 be such a sequence. We argue by induction on m ≤ n
that Um = τ
(m)(X). Clearly this holds for m = 0 since U0 = X. Suppose it holds for m < n.
To see it holds for m + 1, note that equation (6.8) and equation (6.9) and the induction
hypothesis imply
∀ w ∈ τ (m)(X) ∂(Sm[w]) = w(6.10)
Um+1 = {v ∈ ρ : ∃ w ∈ τ (m)(X) vηw} = τ (m+1)(X)(6.11)
So consider the following function f : ω → Lα defined as follows: f(m) = U iff there is a
sequence 〈U0, S0, . . . , Um, Sm〉 satisfying (6.8)-(6.9) such that U = Um. Then the graph of f
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is Σ˜Lαn -definable and so by Σn-replacement, its graph exists as a set in Lα. Hence the infinite
sequence 〈τ (0)(X), τ (1)(X), . . . , τ (n)(X), . . .〉 is an element of Lα and so by equation (6.7),
one also has that trclη(x) = trclη(∂(X)) ∈ Lα. So we have finished now the verification of
equation (6.5).
Now we proceed to the verification of equation (6.2). Suppose first that we have an
extension x ∈ wfExt(N ). Recall that the membership conditions of wfExt(N ) are defined
in equation (2.13), so that
(6.12) N |= (Trclη(σ(x)), η) is well-founded & (Trclη(σ(x))) ⊆ rng(∂)
By equation (6.4), we automatically have that
(6.13) (trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ {w ∈ ρ : N |= Trclη(x)(w) ∨ w = x} ⊆ rng(∂)
Hence from equation (6.5), we may conclude that trclη(x) ∈ Lα. Note that if we set F =
trclη(x) then F satisfies the following condition:
(6.14) [∀ z (zηx→ Fz) & ∀ u, v ((Fv & uηv)→ Fu)]
Since F ∈ (P (ρ)∩Lα), it follows that the converse to equation (6.4) holds as well, so that we
may conclude trclη(x) = {w ∈ ρ : N |= Trclη(x)(w)}. So now suppose that (trclη(x)∪{x}, η)
is not ∆˜Lαn -well-founded. Then there is some non-empty ∆˜Lαn -definable subset Z of (trclη(x)∪{x}, η) which has no η-least member. By ∆n-separation in Lα on the set (trclη(x)∪{x}) ∈ Lα,
we have Z ∈ P (ρ) ∩ Lα, which is a contradiction. So we just completed the left-to-right
direction of equation (6.2). For the other direction, suppose that x ∈ ρ and
(6.15) (trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is ∆˜Lαn -well-founded & (trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ rng(∂)
Then equation (6.5) implies that trclη(x) ∈ Lα. By a similar argument, we have that x ∈
wfExt(N ). So we have now finished verifying equation (6.2).
Now we turn to constructing an embedding j : Lα → ρ. By transfinite recursion, there
is Σ˜Lαn -definable j : Lα → ρ which satisfies j(x) = ∂({j(y) : y ∈ x}). Then one has that y ∈ ximplies j(y)ηj(x). Further, since ∂ : Lα → ρ is an injection, we may argue by induction
that j : Lα → ρ is an injection. Since j : Lα → ρ is an injection, y ∈ x iff j(y)ηj(x).
Hence, j : Lα → ρ is indeed an embedding.
Now we argue that j : Lα → wfExt∗(N ). First let us show:
(6.16) x ∈ Lα =⇒ (trclη(j(x)) ∪ {j(x)}) ⊆ rng(j) ⊆ rng(∂)
Let x ∈ Lα and let y ∈ trclη(j(x)). Then there are y1, . . . , yn in ρ with y1 = y and yn = j(x)
and y1ηy2, . . . yn-1ηyn. Then using the definition of j we may argue by induction that yi =
j(xi) for xi ∈ Lα. Let us now argue that
(6.17) x ∈ Lα =⇒ (trclη(j(x)) ∪ {j(x)}, η) is well-founded
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For, suppose that there was an infinite descending η-sequence yn in the set (trclη(j(x)) ∪
{j(x)}) ⊆ rng(j). Then since j is an embedding this would lead to an infinite descending ∈-
sequence.
Before proceeding, let’s note that η is well-founded on wfExt∗(N ). For, suppose that ∅ 6=
X ⊆ wfExt∗(N ). Choose x withXx, so that of course x is in wfExt∗(N ). Then considerX ′ =
X ∩ (trclη(x) ∪ {x}), which is a non-empty subset of trclη(x) ∪ {x}. So there is some x0
with X ′x0 such that yηx0 implies ¬X ′y. Suppose that yηx0 with Xy. Since x0 is in trclη(x)∪
{x} and yηx0, we have that y is in (trclη(x)∪{x}). Then of course y is in X ′ = X∩(trclη(x)∪
{x}), which is a contradiction. So indeed η is well-founded on wfExt∗(N ).
Now let us argue that j : Lα → wfExt∗(N ) is surjective. First note that it follows from
the definitions that the class wfExt∗(N ) is transitive in the following sense:
(6.18) [y, z ∈ ρ & y ∈ wfExt∗(N ) & zηy] =⇒ z ∈ wfExt∗(N )
So let’s proceed in establishing surjectivity by reductio: suppose that j : Lα → wfExt∗(N ) is
not surjective. So there is some y ∈ wfExt∗(N )\j”Lα. Since η is well-founded on wfExt∗(N )
and since wfExt∗(N ) is transitive (6.18), there is y ∈ wfExt∗(N ) \ j”Lα such that
(6.19) zηy =⇒ z ∈ (wfExt∗(N ) ∩ j”Lα)
Since y ∈ wfExt∗(N ) ⊆ rng(∂), choose Y ∈ (P (ρ) ∩ Lα) such that ∂(Y ) = y. Then by the
previous equation, we may conclude that Lα |= ∀ z ∈ Y ∃ x j(x) = z. By Σn-collection,
choose X ∈ Lα such that Lα |= ∀ z ∈ Y ∃ x ∈ X j(x) = z. Then set X ′ = X ∩ j−1(Y ) =
{x ∈ X : j(x) ∈ Y } which is in Lα by ∆n-separation since in addition to its natural Σ˜Lαn -definition it has the following Π˜Lαn -definition: X ′ = {x ∈ X : ∀ y ∈ (Lα \ Y ) j(x) 6= y}.Also {j(x) : x ∈ X ′} = Y , so that we have j(X ′) = ∂({j(x) : x ∈ X ′}) = ∂(Y ) = y which
contradicts the hypothesis that y was not in the image of j.
Finally note that the isomorphism j : (Lα,∈) → (wfExt∗(N ), η) is the inverse of the
Mostowski collapse pi : (wfExt∗(N ), η)→ (Lα,∈) due to the uniqueness of the latter isomor-
phism.
Theorem 6.2. ( Second Identification of the Well-Founded Extensions) Suppose that n ≥ 1
and Lα is Σn-admissible and satisfies Axiom Beta. Let ρ = ρn(Lα) < α and let ∂ : Lα → ρ
be a witnessing Σ˜Lαn -definable injection. Then the structure
(6.20) N = (ρ, P (ρ) ∩ Lα, P (ρ× ρ) ∩ Lα, . . . , ∂  P (ρ) ∩ Lα)
is a model of Σ11-LB + GC, where the global well-order on objects is given by the membership
relation on ρ. Further, (Lα,∈) is isomorphic to (wfExt(N ), η).
Proof. By the previous theorem, it suffices to show that wfExt(N ) ⊆ wfExt∗(N ). For this,
it suffices to show that for all x ∈ ρ we have
[(trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is ∆˜Lαn -well-founded & (trclη(x) ∪ {x}) ⊆ rng(∂)]
=⇒ (trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is well-founded(6.21)
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So suppose that x ∈ ρ satisfies the hypothesis of this conditional. Then define the set X =
(trclη(x) ∪ {x}), which is in Lα by (6.5) of the previous proof. Then by the proposition on
the existence of restricted η-relation (Proposition 2.7), choose binary relation EX ∈ Lα such
that EX ⊆ ρ×X and such that Xa implies EX(b, a) iff bηa. Since X is η-transitive, we have
that EX ⊆ X × X. Then the hypothesis that (trclη(x) ∪ {x}, η) is ∆˜Lαn -well-founded andthe η-transitivity of X implies
(6.22) Lα |= (X,EX) is well-founded and extensional
Since the structure Lα satisfies Axiom Beta, the structure Lα satisfies the Mostowski Collapse
Theorem (cf. discussion following Definition 4.2). Then there is a transitive set M in Lα and
a map pi in Lα such that pi : (X,EX)→ (M,∈) is an isomorphism. Suppose that (X,EX) is
not well-founded. Then there is an infinite decreasing η-sequence xi in X ⊆ Lα. Then pi(xi)
is an infinite decreasing ∈-sequence.
This allows us to now establish the Main Theorem 2.9:
Proof. (of Theorem 2.9): By compactness, this follows from the Existence Theorem 5.2 and
the Second Identification of the Well-Founded Sets Theorem 6.2. Here we’re also appealing
to the connection between the union of the axiomatic characterizations of Σn-admissibility
and ZFC-P, which we noted immediately after the definition of Σn-admissibility (cf. Defini-
tion 4.1).
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